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ABSTRACT
The objective of this study is to determine the effect of solicitation and 
independence on corporate bond ratings. Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch IBCA, are full-scale 
agencies that provide both solicited and unsolicited ratings. These agencies have the 
potential to provide biased ratings in both directions. Duff and Phelps provides only 
solicited ratings. It is the only agency that will honor an issuer’s request not to be rated. 
This fully solicited agency also has the potential to provide biased ratings. Little or no 
prior research exists in this area.
MCM, an independent rating agency until it was merged into Duff and Phelps in 
1991, took no fee from the issuers. The agency Egan-Jones can be considered to be a 
modern-day MCM. However, there is a dearth of literature dealing with the independent 
agencies. Weiss Ratings is an independent agency that rates primarily insurance firms.
This study test five hypotheses in order to determine whether solicitation and 
independence may have an effect in the agencies’ ratings. The Friedman Two-Way 
Analysis of Variance is the primary test utilized. The findings reveal that Duff and 
Phelps provides the highest ratings followed by Fitch IBCA. The ratings for Moody’s 
and S&P are lower than both Fitch IBCA and Duff and Phelps and are not significantly 
different from each other. There is no significant difference in terms of timeliness for 
upgradings. The four full-scale rating agencies upgrade their ratings at the same time.
iii
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Moody’s and S&P downgrade their ratings at an earlier time than Duff and Phelps 
and Fitch IBCA. Moody’s has a higher upgrade magnitude than Duff and Phelps.
The results for the independence hypotheses reveal that MCM provides lower 
ratings than both Moody’s and S&P. In addition, MCM is more time in terms of 
upgradings.
The results indicate that the fully solicited agency has incentives to be reluctant 
to provide the true rating. This result indicates that Duff and Phelps and to a lesser degree 
Fitch IBCA are hesitant to upset the issuers.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Rating agencies provide investors with information concerning the risk, quality, 
and marketability of various bond issues. The agencies utilize coverage and leverage 
ratios. The ratings describe the possibility of default and assess the protection creditors 
have in the event o f a default. Four large full-scale agencies have historically dominated 
the bond rating industry. These are Moody’s Investors’s Service, Standard & Poor’s 
Corp, Fitch IBCA and Duff and Phelps. In addition, there are other agencies including 
Thompson BankWatch, Egan-Jones, international agencies, and A.M. Best and Weiss 
Ratings which rate health and insurance firms.
The two major bond rating agencies, Moody's Investors Service and Standard & 
Poor's Corporation, have come under mounting scrutiny and criticism in recent years. 
The Justice Department has investigated Moody’s Investors Service for allegedly 
pressuring bond issuers to use its ratings (Harington (1997), Gasparino and Vogelstein 
1996)). Airline industry financial officials have expressed frustration with Moody's and 
Standard and Poor's Corporation (Jennings 1995). Elliott (1988) has pointed out that most 
industrial firms believe the debt-rating agencies have failed to revise their ratings as 
conditions have changed.
1
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In the past decade, both Moody's and Standard & Poor’s downgraded at least four 
firms’ listings immediately before their default Some critics have accused Moody's and 
S&P of responding to political pressure when rating some states and cities. Additionally, 
Hawthorne (1990) has asserted that the agencies did not understand local political 
nuances.
Many investors have questioned the credibility of these two rating agencies 
because of these problems. Additionally, these investors have questioned these agencies’ 
independence from their clients. This lack of credibility has extended to the other full- 
scale bond rating agencies. Fitch IBCA and Duff and Phelps have also faced criticism 
regarding their independence.
The solicitation issue, also, has concerned many investors. Duff and Phelps, 
alone among rating agencies, has published exclusively solicited ratings. Historically, 
Duff and Phelps has honored any firm’s request to not rate its bonds. Fitch IBCA has 
published mostly solicited ratings. Critics have accused these two smaller full-scale 
agencies of a too-close connection with the bond issuers and a resulting ratings bias.
Hence, all four full-scale bond rating agencies have some degree of dependence 
upon issuers. Each of these ratings agencies receive rating fees from their clients, the 
bond issuers. Thomson Bank Watch, a fifth bond rating agency has rated banks only. 
Egan-Jones, the sixth and newest agency, has published ratings only.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Problem Statement
The issues o f solicitation and independence have created the need for empirical 
research on two questions. First, does an agency’s policy toward publishing solicited 
and/or unsolicited ratings affect its ratings? The literature has not addressed this 
important issue. The actions of Duff and Phelps allows examination of this matter.
Second, does independence affect corporate bond ratings? A study o f the 
McCarthy, Crisanti & Maffei Inc. (MCM) bond rating agency can address this issue. 
MCM, which merged into Duff& Phelps in 1991, provides the only source of reference 
for independence. The fixed-income and credit rating operation, MCM has taken no 
fees from its clients. The sale of its ratings has constituted MCM’s only source of 
income.
Unlike its competitors, MCM has not had any communication with the 
management of the issuers, and, for the most part, MCM has relied on public 
information. This important difference between MCM and the four other bond rating 
firms could have meant that MCM provided an issuer’s true credit rating.
Despite these relationships, no one has examined MCM. This study will test 
whether MCM's ratings differed from Moody's and/or S&P’s. Also, it will test whether 
MCM often changed its ratings before Moody's and S&P. Hence, the study should 
provide evidence of whether independence has affected ratings and timeliness of bond 
rating changes. Table 1 depicts these issues.
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Table 1: Comparison of the Five Tested Agencies
4






In the context of bond ratings, the term “solicited” has meant that issuers 
requested and paid fees for them. Solicited bond ratings have outnumbered unsolicited 
ratings. Duff and Phelps has published solicited ratings only. S&P, Moody’s, Fitch 
IBCA, and Thompson Bankwatch have published both solicited and unsolicited ratings.
An agency could have provided unsolicited ratings in order to gain publicity, 
develop clients, and gain market share. For example, S&P has had a low financial 
institution market share. Thus, they recently decided to give unsolicited ratings to 750 
banks in an apparent attempt to increase business. Additionally an agency could have 
provided unsolicited ratings in order to induce clients to later convert to a paid solicited 
basis.
Based on discussions with personnel in the industry, the practice of publishing 
both unsolicited and solicited ratings may have created the potential for malfeasance. In 
this respect, the agency may have caused the suspicion that it assigned an inflated rating 
in order to provide an incentive for the issuer to solicit future ratings. On the other hand,
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an unsolicited rating may have inappropriately reflected a lower rating than the true one 
as punishment for an issuer that declined to pay for it.
As advantage, unsolicited ratings have no taint from management feedback 
(Monro-Davis 1994). The rating service should rely solely on public information. A 
disadvantage of unsolicited ratings, the agency does not have the opportunity to 
interview management.
An independent firm such as MCM takes no fee from the issuer; hence, it has no 
incentive to give a higher rating in order to induce conversion. Likewise, the 
independent firm has no incentive to give a lower rating. The ratings of the independent 
agency do not include ratings of customers or potential customers. The new corporate 
bond rating agency, Egan-Jones, functions as an independent agency, or in effect, a 
modern-day MCM. In addition, Weiss Ratings, which gives safety ratings, receives no 
compensation from the companies it rates.
The independent agency has no incentive to assign higher ratings in order to 
satisfy issuers. Rather, the independent agency has the overall incentive to maintain a 
reputation for very accurate ratings. If investors should lose confidence in an 
independent agency’s ratings, issuers would no longer believe they could lower their 
funding costs by obtaining its ratings (Cantor and Packer 1994).
Contributions of this Study 
This study makes several contributions to an understanding of bond ratings: the 
first is that it reports the results of empirical research on Duff and Phelps and it explores
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6
ramifications of solicitation, and it addresses the independence issue. A recent 
independent survey (Cantwell 1998a) revealed the growing importance o f Duff and 
Phelps as a bond rating agency. Bond issuers ranked Duff and Phelps as the best of five 
rating agencies in the areas of quality service, comprehensive research, and analyst 
expertise. The study explores solicitation by comparing Duff & Phelps to the other full- 
scale rating agencies.
In testing these hypotheses, this study has utilized data from the late 1990's; prior 
research of S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch IBCA for the most part utilized much older data. 
An exception, Altman (1998) in his study of expected ratings changes in S&P and 
Moody’s, used data through 1996.
In the last few years, Fitch IBCA and Duff and Phelps have had dramatic 
increases in bond ratings activity. This enormous increase in the rating of issuers’ bonds 
of these two agencies in the U.S. and abroad is revealed in Reinebach (1998a) and 
Reinebach (1998b). This present study has utilized data from 1993 through 1998, and it 
will reflect that increase.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORY
This study attempts to determine the effect of both solicitation and independence 
on corporate bond ratings. It addresses significant potential biases endemic to agencies 
who provide strictly solicited ratings or a combination of solicited and unsolicited ratings. 
The importance of the fully solicited agency has increased as Duff and Phelps was 
recently rated the top global rating agency in a survey of issuers.
This study has tested the issue of independence in order to determine if these 
agencies have provided true ratings. The independent status of the newest agency, Egan- 
Jones, also reflects the importance of the independent agency.
This study has focused on split ratings (a split rating occurs when two or more 
agencies rate the same bond issue differently). The area of split ratings has received 
considerable attention in previous research. Except for Hite and Warga (1997) and 
limited other research which compared Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch, most prior studies 
examined only Moody’s and S&P.
7
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Reliability o f Bond Ratings
The reliability of the bond ratings has often manifested itself in terms of relative 
and absolute risks of corporate bond defaults. Ratings must at a minimum provide a 
reasonable rank-ordering or relative credit risks (Cantor and Packer 1994). In addition, 
ratings must provide a reliable guide to absolute credit risk. Cantor and Packer showed 
that Moody’s and S&P satisfactorily assessed relative credit risks; lower rated bonds 
tended to default on a more frequent basis.
Altman (1989) showed a very robust pattern of increasing yields as the respective 
ratings category decreased. This relationship held without exception across all years. 
Cantor and Packer (1994) regarded this correlation test as a possible weak test of ratings 
reliability. However, Artus, Garrigues, and Sassenou (1993) alleged a weak or 
nonexistent direct relationship between yield and the largest rating agency in the French 
bond market.
Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts (1987) found mixed evidence as to whether 
bond ratings contained information not already captured in the market yields 
(Ederington,Yawitz, and Roberts 1987). Cantor and Packer (1994) asserted that even 
if ratings did not contain independent credit risk information, both investors and 
regulators might find value if ratings provided them an efficient summary of this 
information. Furthermore, the authors asserted that measuring ratings performance by 
contemporaneous market yields did not control for waves of either market optimism or 
pessimism. One needs to accumulate ex post bond performance evidence. Clark, Foster, 
and Ghani (1997) investigated the information effects of bond rating changes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In an event study, Katz (1974) found little evidence that a rating change provided 
information to the market. His study utilized an event-oriented methodology for testing 
bond market efficiency. Similarly, Hettenhouse and Sattoris (1976) asserted that a rating 
change for investment-grade public utility bonds provided no information to 
shareholders.
Furthermore, Weinstein (1977) concluded that a rating change led to no 
significant price change during or after the event. Weinstein also showed that the market 
anticipated the change and makes adjustments from the prior six to eighteen months. In 
a similar fashion, Pinches and Singleton (1978) revealed that upgradings (downgradings) 
produced abnormally high (low) common stock returns before the rating change. The 
authors found a lag that ensured a complete discount of any relevant information by the 
change month.
However, much evidence has indicated that bond rating changes provide valuable 
new information. Providing significant support for this position, Griffin and Sanvicente 
(1982) utilized a paired-sample approach in order to control for additional public 
information. The authors concluded that bond rating changes (both upgrades and 
downgrades) provided new information to common stockholders in the eleven months 
before the change. However, only downgrades conveyed new information in the event 
month itself. In a similar fashion, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), concluded that bond 
rating downgrades created a negative response.
The relationship ofbond rating changes and the behavior of equity returns and risk 
requires more in-depth analysis. Bi and Levy (1993) analyzed the market reaction to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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bond downgradings and found that investors reacted significantly to bond downgradings. 
Investor and issuer perceptions have not historically coincided on bond ratings. For 
example, Ellis (1998) showed that investors, unlike issuers, would preferred to see 
ratings updated immediately in order to reflect all relevant information, even for 
temporary changes. Investors regard agency ratings as more reliable indicators of 
absolute credit risks.
Ratings Migration
Cantor and Packer showed that default probabilities and specific letter ratings 
have clearly drifted over time. Altman (1998) assessed the rating change experience of 
corporate bonds originating from two distinct initial states: from the time of issuance to 
up to 10 years post-issuance and from a static-pool of issuers of a given rating, 
irrespective of the bonds’ ages, to up to 10 years after pool formation.
Altman and Kao (1991) examined the question of rating change auto-correlation. 
He sought to determine whether, after observing a rating change, one could expect 
subsequent credit quality changes of the same issuer. They concluded that one could, and 
they found that the two change in the same direction (upgrade or downgrade).
Altman (1988) examined the impact of rating change on fixed income portfolio 
compositions of investors. Altman found this impact particularly restricted to fixed 
income portfolio compositions with specifically defined credit
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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History of the Raring Agencies
Bond rating agencies evolved from mercantile credit agencies. These mercantile 
credit agencies rated merchants’ ability to pay their financial obligations (Cantor and 
Packer 1994).
In 1841, due to the financial crisis of 1837, Louis Tappan established the first 
mercantile credit agency in New York. Robert Dun subsequently acquired this agency 
and published its first ratings guide in 1859. In 1849, John Bradstreet formed a similar 
mercantile agency and published a ratings book in 1857. The two agencies were merged 
into Dun and Bradstreet in 1933. In 1962, Dun and Bradstreet bought Moody’s Investors 
Service.
In 1909, the ratings business expanded to encompass securities ratings. This 
expansion occurred when John Moody began to rate U.S. railroad bonds. In 1910, Moody 
extended his ratings to utility and industrial bonds (Cantor and Packer 1994). In 1916, 
Poor’s Publishing Company issued its first ratings. In 1922, Standard Statistics Company 
issued its first ratings. In 1941, Standard Statistics and Poor’s Publishing Company 
merged to form Standard and Poor’s (S&P).
The Fitch Publishing Company issued its first ratings in 1924. IBCA, a unit of 
Fimalac SA in Paris, France issued its first ratings in 1978. In 1997, Fitch merged with 
IBCA. The merger combined IBCA’s worldwide network of offices (that had experience 
rating banks and securities outside the U.S) with Fitch’s U.S. expertise. The merger 
created the third largest worldwide rating agency.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In 1998, Fitch IBCA acquired one of Mexico’s top three rating agencies, 
Clasificadora de Riesgos, S.A de C.V. (Kraus 1998). The Mexican agency rates almost 
100 industrial firms.
Duff and Phelps (DCR) first began to provide ratings for a diverse spectrum of 
issuers in 1982. However, DCR had researched public utility companies since 1932. 
McCarthy, Crisanti, and Maffei (MCM) began in 1975; subsequently acquired by the 
firm Xerox Financial Services, but MCM retained its name. MCM merged with Duff 
and Phelps in 1991.
Egan-Jones, based in Wynnewood, PA, issued its first ratings in 1996. Egan- 
Jones provided ratings for 850 issuers in that year, and it has since gradually expanded.
Specialized and Foreign Agencies
Thomson Bankwatch operated as a subsidiary of Keefe, Bruyette, and Woods, a 
brokerage firm until March 1989, when Thomson Corporation, a large private 
international publishing conglomerate based in Toronto bought it. Thomson Bankwatch 
now rates over 1000 financial institutions.
Two other rating agencies, A.M. Best and Weiss Ratings, rate life/health 
insurance companies. In 1999, A.M. Best began to give debt ratings on specific bonds 
of insurers. Before 1999, A.M. best rated the firm’s overall debt Weiss Ratings issues 
safety ratings on over 16,000 financial institutions, including HMOs, life and health 
insurers, Blue Cross Blue Shield plans, property and casualty insurers, banks and brokers. 
Weiss Ratings also evaluates the Y2K preparedness of many insurers and banks, as well
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
as the risk adjusted performance of more than 5,000 mutual funds. Unlike, the full-scale 
rating agencies, AM. Best and Weiss Ratings are not recognized as a Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rated Organization.
Weiss Ratings receives no compensation from the companies it rates. It derives 
its revenues from sales of its products to consumers, businesses, agents, and libraries (Cox 
1998). The firm refuses all insurance executives who invite the agency to hear their 
business and investment plans before assigning them a grade in the Weiss Rating 
publications.
Weiss Ratings bases their ratings almost exclusively on data from the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The NAIC collects financial 
information filed by insurers to state regulators. The firm extract 700 separate figures 
from the NAIC data and incorporates these figures into a complex computer analysis Cox 
1998).
It is interesting to note the fees Weiss Ratings charges for its publications. 
Customers calling by phone can check a company’s Weiss rating for a fee of $15. 
Individual written reports cost $25. A complete directory of listings with information of 
each company costs $219.
Credit ratings overseas have increased significantly. Dale and Thomas (1991) 
described the incidence of credit ratings in the financial markets of most developed 
economies and numerous emerging market countries. Two major rating agencies operate 
in Canada, and two major agencies operate in Japan (Cantor and Packer 1994). The 
increase in foreign demand has also led to a significant overseas expansion of the U.S.
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rating agencies. Moody’shas opened offices in Tokyo, London, Paris, Sydney, Frankfurt, 
and Madrid. Moody’s rates the securities of nearly 1,200 of approximately 4,500 non- 
U.S. issuers (Cantor and Packer 1994.) S&P has similar offices overseas, Mexico City, 
and in Stockholm. Duff and Phelps has formed joint ventures in Mexico and in many 
Latin American countries ((Reinebach 1998b). Cantor and Packer (1994) asserted that 
the full-scale U.S. agencies have a competitive advantage over their foreign counterparts 
in terms of providing objective, credible corporate bond ratings.
Of the non-U.S. countries, England has the highest percentage o f its large 
companies rated by the U.S. agencies (Ball 1994) and Japan has the second highest 
percentage. In contrast, only a small percentage of French firms have a long-term 
Euromarket debt rated by Moody’s. Among Italian firms, only Fiat has a U.S. agency 
rating its debt issues.
Rating Other Debt Instruments
The four full-scale agencies rate not only long-term bonds issued by U.S. firms 
but also a broad spectrum of other debt instruments. These include: municipal bonds, 
asset-backed securities,preferred stocks, medium-term note programs, shelf registrations, 
private placements, commercial paper programs, and bank certificates of deposit (Cantor 
and Packer 1994).
In addition, ratings have been recently applied to other types of risks. In 1998 and 
1999, Egan-Jones rated the price volatility of mutual funds. Weiss Ratings is expected 
to provide customer service ratings, particularly in the health-care arena (Cox 1998).
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Fitch IBCA rates an increasing number of non-acute care bonds. These are bonds from 
assisted living centers and nursing homes (Hill 1997).
Rating agencies recently began applying rating classifications to the performance 
risk of mortgage-backed securities (Goldstein 1996). Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch 
IBCA, and Duff and Phelps have utilized different methods to assign rating categories 
to multiclass mortgage-backed securities(MBS).
Moody’s has defined its MBS ratings so that two identically-rated MBS securities 
will have the same expected return, even though one of the securities may have a greater 
default likelihood than the other. S&P and Fitch IBCA have defined their ratings so 
that two identically (S&P- or Fitch-) rated MBS securities will both have the same 
likelihood of default, even though one may have a higher expected rate of return than the 
other. Duff and Phelps has defined its ratings so that any two identically rated MBS will 
not necessarily have the same expected return or the same likelihood of default, but the 
formula takes these measures into account (Goldstein 1996). Hence, rating agency 
classifications have gained importance in the structuring and pricing of mortgage-based 
securities.
Reflecting the importance of these ratings, several mutual funds and pension funds 
have placed limits on the portfolio amount that they will invest in non-investment-grade 
securities. Some investors and issuers specifically require ratings in bond covenants. 
Similarly, investors and issuers often ask for guidance from the rating agencies on the 
structuring of their financial transactions.
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The Genesis of Charging Issuers 
Rating agencies initially provided free public ratings of an issuer. In those times, 
the rating agencies financed their operations solely through the sale of publications and 
related materials. However, users could easily copy these ratings. The publications did 
not yield sufficient returns in order to justify intensive coverage (Cantor and Packer 
1994).
The demand on rating agencies for faster and more comprehensive service steadily 
increased. Hence, the agencies began to charge issuers for ratings. Cantor and Packer
(1994) noted that the agencies utilized these revenues in order to compete with private 
sector analysts at other financial institutions.
The default of Penn Central Railroad on $82 million of commercial paper in 1970 
played a key role in the transition to charging issuers. With little regard for credit quality, 
the commercial paper market grew significantly in the 1960's (Cantor and Packer 1994). 
Investors regarded any firm with a household name as an acceptable credit risk during this 
time period. When Penn Central defaulted, investors became skeptical of the financial 
condition of many firms. Those investors refused to roll over their commercial paper 
during the 1970s. Those firms soon faced a liquidity crisis, and many defaulted.
In order to reassure nervous investors, the issuers actively sought credit ratings. 
The demand for rating services grew significantly. The rating agencies took advantage 
of this increased demand, and they soon discovered that they could impose charges on 
the issuers.
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In 1970, Fitch and Moody’s started to charge the issuers for ratings (Cantor and 
Packer 1994). Standard and Poor’s followed a few years later. Standard and Poor’s 
started to charge municipal bond issuers for ratings in 1968. Since 1985, about four-fifth 
of Standard and Poor’s revenue has come from issuer fees (Ederington and Yawitz 1987).
The fees that the agencies have charged have varied with the size and type o f the 
issue. A representative fee on a new long-term corporate bond issue has ranged from 2 
to 3 basis points of the principal for each year of rating maintenance. Conversations with 
rating agency personnel have revealed that the initial fee ranged from $2,500 to 
$100,000. Frequent issuers have often negotiated rates.
The Ratings Process
The ratings process also requires a great amount of time and effort for the debt- 
issuer, the underwriter and the rating agency. The agency usually assigns a staff 
committee to vote on a recommendation by a senior analyst. This vote occurs after 
presentation and discussion.
An explanatory analysis has usually accompanied a rating assignment. The 
assigned rating first went to the issuer and underwriter and subsequently to the public at 
large. The dissatisfied issuer often had the opportunity to appeal a rating. However, the 
structure of the ratings process has allowed the issuer to present its best case during the 
rating process (Ederington and Yawitz 1987). Cantwell(1998a),rankedDuffandPhelps, 
the fully solicited agency, as doing a better job of explaining its rating process than any 
other rating agency.
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The number o f downgrades in corporate bond ratings has exceeded the number 
of upgrades in recent years (Blume, Lim and MacKinlay 1998). Instead of declining 
credit quality of U.S. corporate debt, an alternative explanation for this can be related to 
the agencies’ changing ratings process. The rating agencies have recently used more 
stringent standards ( Blume, Lim and MacKinlay 1998), and the tougher standards have 
contributed to the downward trend.
Confidential Ratings 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch IBCA have offered confidential ratings. 
Conversations with Duff and Phelps personnel have revealed that DCR does not offer 
confidential ratings. The agencies have offered confidential ratings, known often as 
indicators (Gasparino and Hamilton 1998). Some bonds represent a firm’s first issue. 
Other issuers offered bonds with a different structure and wanted to know how a bond 
might have rated before it went to the market
Critics of these confidential ratings have considered the practice open to abuse and 
recommended caution by investors. The key concern has dealt with whether the issuers 
would openly “shop around” for the highest ratings and subsequently withhold 
assessments they did not like from investors. The investors clearly would have wanted 
this withheld information for use in their decisions as to whether or not to buy the bonds. 
In effect, the issuers of the bonds could censor the ratings that they did not like. To 
counteract the criticism of these confidential ratings, Moody’s has reserved the right to 
make its confidential assessment public if it suspected the occurrence of ratings shopping
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(Gasparino and Hamilton 1998). Standard & Poor’s and Fitch IBCA have not reserved 
this right. Standard & Poor’s and Fitch IBCA has claimed that they had a duty to reveal 
confidential ratings, even if bond issuers abused the indicators. Standard & Poor’s 
asserted that the issuers had the obligation to follow their own legal and moral standards 
(Gasparino and Hamilton 1998).
Ratings and Regulations 
Regulators of financial markets and institutions have increasingly utilized ratings 
to aid in the task of prudential oversight (Cantor and Packer 1994). Almost all financial 
regulators have relied on these ratings. These regulators have included public authorities 
which oversee banks, thrifts, insurance firms, securities firms, capital markets, mutual 
funds and private pensions.
Cantor and Packer (1994) pointed out that the early regulatory uses of ratings drew 
only on the agency distinctions between investment grade securities (those rated BBB and 
above), and speculative securities (those rated BB and below). The regulations required 
holding extra capital against speculative securities and/or prohibited such investments 
altogether (Cantor and Packer 1994). Over time, regulatory capital requirements, 
disclosure requirements, and investment prohibitions have increasingly applied to other 
grades as well.
The Origins o f Ratings Disagreements 
The variety of rating methodologies has often resulted in different ratings among 
the agencies. Other differences have resulted from the judgmental element, particularly
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in regard to systematic differences in agencies’ evaluation of acceptable risk levels for 
particular categories.
Formal definitions that agencies have published for their various letter ratings 
could have contributed to ratings disagreements. However, Cantor and Packer (1994) 
asserted that these definitions provide very little insight about rating agency differences. 
The agencies often displayed these definitions on their internet sites. The authors stressed 
that the definitions implied a different likelihood of default and they could not quantify 
the rating differences.
In some instances, the differences among rating agencies resulted from unique 
philosophies. For example, Moody’s had a tendency to give a higher rating to an asset- 
based security that likely would recover most of its principal in the event of default 
(Cantor and Packer 1994).
Standard and Poor’s, does not base ratings on expected recoveries. All of the 
agencies have focused on expected recoveries in the situation of different classes of debt 
issued by the same firm. For example, when a firm defaulted on its subordinated debts, 
its senior debt generally went into default However, agencies usually have rewarded 
ratings to the senior debt because of higher expected recovery rates. Barclay and Smith
(1995) discussed in detail the maturity structure of corporate debt.
Previous researchers have found many examples of rating agencies 
implementing unique ratings philosophies. Duff and Phelps has sometimes given higher 
ratings for medium-term notes than for longer term securities of the same issuers. 
Moody’s has been more hesitant than Standard & Poor’s to assign a higher rating to a
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country’s domestic currency obligations than to its foreign currency obligations (Purcell, 
Brown, Chang, and Damrau 1993).
Regulatory Methods for Resolving Ratings Disagreements 
Regulations have included methods for dealing with rating disagreements among 
agencies. Regulators need to find a method to resolve these differences. Cantor and 
Packer (1994) provide two approaches to dealing with the split ratings: explicit rules and 
independent analysis.
The majority o f regulations simply have accepted an explicit rule, recognizing 
either the highest rating or the second highest rating. The second highest rating rule has 
attempted to compromise between a conservative policy (eliminating the highest ratings) 
and a liberal policy. In the years when Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s dominated 
the ratings industry, this second highest rating rule effected conservatism because the 
second highest rating also served as the lowest rating. The large increase in the number 
of nationally recognized statistical rated organizations (NRSROs) has given issuers now 
three, four, or more ratings and made this policy much more liberal.
Insurance regulators have conducted independent analyses in order to resolve 
disagreements among the agencies (NAIC 1994). Hence, the insurance regulators have 
incurred the cost of establishing in-house analytical capacity (Cantor and Packer 1994).
National Association ofInsuranceCommissioners(NAIC)practiceshave assigned 
each bond held by an insurance company to one of six quality categories. Category 1 
corresponds to AAA, AA, and A; Category 2 corresponds to BBB; category 3 
corresponds tp BB; Category 4 corresponds to B; Category 5 or Category 6 corresponds
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to CCC, C or D ratings. Each category has had a different implication for mandatory 
reserves (NAIC 1994).
However, the NAIC’s Securities Valuation Office has had the freedom to assign 
a rating that differed from the bond’s public credit rating as long as their judgment 
implied a downgrade from the respective public credit rating (Cantor and Packer 1994). 
Hence, the NAIC has allowed for discarding certain ratings viewed as too high.
Regulatory Rules
The regulatory rules that have been based on the distinction between investment 
grade and speculative securities have since expanded. Since 1975, the SEC has required 
dealers to hold extra capital against their inventories of speculative or junk bonds. 
Congress in 1989 passed legislation that prohibited thrifts from investing in junk bonds 
in response to the S&L scandal.
Cantor and Demsetz (1993) showed that the achievement of an investment grade 
rating eases the burden of disclosure for the issuer. In 1993, the SEC adopted Rule 3s-7, 
which made the investment grade rating a criterion for the public issuance of certain asset- 
backed securities.
Cantor and Packer (1994) emphasized that regulators increasingly used ratings 
other than BBB as thresholds in their rules. Regulations have eased issuance and 
enhanced the marketability of bonds rated AAA or AA. Recently the federal reserve 
Board also began to implement an AA cutoff in specific prudential rules affecting bank 
supervision. Baron and Murch (1993) showed that the single A rating has also served
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
as a cutoff. For example, the Labor Department, in its role as overseer of the retirement 
funds industry, adopted a regulation in 1988permitting pension fund investments in asset- 
backed securities rated single-A or better.
Regulations have also impacted ratings on mutual fund investments. In 1991, 
the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 that 
imposed ratings-based restrictions on money market mutual fund investments(Crable and 
Post 1992). Following the adoption of this amendment, mutual fund holding of lower 
quality paper fell to zero, and the total amount of lower quality paper outstanding 
decreased significantly.
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
The SEC currently designates five rating agencies as nationally recognized 
statistical rating organisations (NRSROs). The other regulators generally rely on the 
SEC’s designations. Cantor and Packer (1994) stated that under most current ratings- 
dependent regulations in the United States, ratings mattered only if an NRSRO issued 
them. Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch in 1975 received the first NRSRO 
designations given by the SEC. Soon other agencies sought NRSRO designation from 
the SEC.
In 1982, Duff and Phelps received the designation. In 1991, IBCA received the 
designation followed by a 1992 designation for Thomson BankWatch that limited to their 
ratings for banks and financial institutions only (Cantor and Packer 1994). In 1983, the
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SEC granted NRSRO status to McCarthy, Crisanti, and Maffei (which had merged into 
Duff and Phelps in 1991).
The SEC’s staff analyzes data supplied by the rating agency about its history, 
ownership, employees, financial resources, policies and internal procedures (Cantor and 
Packer 1994). The SEC requires that the market should have already placed substantial 
weight on the judgment of a rating agency in order for the agency to achieve NRSRO 
status (SEC 1994). Hence, by giving the market a role in selecting NRSROs, the SEC 
intended to not designate agencies which had not already established a reputation for 
accurate ratings. Cantor and Packer (1994) pointed out that the practice favored 
incumbents. However, Cantor and Packer should have stated whether or not an NRSRO 
agency had ever had that status taken away.
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EMPIRICAL WORK
This study has tested for whether solicitation and independence have affected 
the determination of corporate bond ratings. The study has utilized recent ratings data 
from the appropriate agencies in order to determine whether providing purely solicited 
ratings versus both solicited and unsolicited ratings had an effect It has also attempted 
to determine whether agencies that did not take a fee from the issuer provided a 
significantly different rating.
Comparison between S&P and Mnndv’s
Jewell and Livingston (1998) provided evidence that when split ratings occurred 
in industrial bonds, neither Moody’s nor S&P gave the higher rating a significant 
percentage of the time. Perry, Evans and Liu (1991) utilized non-parametric statistics 
in order to determine differences in agencies’ ratings. The authors applied the matched 
pairs sign test and the Goodman-Kruskal gamma statistic in order to determine whether 
Moody’s and S&P ratings differed. Beattie and Searle (1992) summarized ratings 
differences among Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s.
Billingsley, Lamy, Marr and Thompson (1985) concluded that the yields on split­
rated bonds did not differ from the yields on bonds without split ratings- As a secondary
25
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finding, the authors noted that investors did not value the ratings of either one of the 
major rating agencies above the other.
To be sure, Billingsley, Lamy, Marr and Thompson (1985) provided insight into 
split ratings and yields. However, the authors did not consider the effect of modified 
ratings. S&P began using modified ratings in 1975; Moody's began in 1982.
Several studies have addressed the issue of split ratings both directly and 
indirectly. Those studies produced inconclusive results.
Jewell and Livingston (1998) found split ratings for Moody’s and S&P for 17 
percent of industrial debt issuers. Altman (1982) found that 24 percent of the ratings 
assigned to bonds of utility companies disagreed. Ederington (1986), in a study of 494 
industrial bonds, found no evidence that either Moody’s or S&P consistently rated debt 
issues higher than the other service. When split ratings occurred, Ederington (1986), 
attributed the variations to intra-agency differences in judgment and inter-agency 
disagreements regarding factors other than the publicly available accounting information.
A study by Morton (1975) of municipal bond ratings found that Moody’s gave 
more conservative ratings than those assigned by S&P. On the other hand, Cates (1977), 
in a study of bank holding companies, found that S&P gave more conservative ratings.
Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts (1987) found that S&P tended to give ratings 
slightly higher than Moody's. However, the results also indicated that the market may 
have viewed a given Moody’s rating as signifying a lower level of risk than the same S&P 
rating. The authors asserted that since bond ratings indicated risk, the ratings had a direct 
effect on the firm's cost of capital.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
In a study of debt issues interest costs, Sorensen (1979) found that interest 
averaged 13 basis points higher when S&P gave bond ratings lower than Moody’s. Costs 
averaged 17 basis points lower when S&P gave the higher bond ratings than Moody's.
Agency Satisfaction 
The 1997 International Survey of Credit Ratings (Cantwell 1998a) of more than 
two hundred thirty issuers rated Duff & Phelps the best in most major categories of 
service among DCR, Moody’s , Standard & Poor’s, Fitch IBCA, and Thomson 
Bankwatch. A high percentage of corporate treasurers had found rating agency analysts 
unqualified (Cantwell 1998b). The survey respondents participated in face-to-face 
meetings with the five rating agencies. The highest satisfaction with preparation by the 
lead analysts of the agencies was with Duff and Phelps. Moody’s registered the lowest 
satisfaction rate. The survey also found that the high turnover rate at Moody’s caused 
much dissatisfaction with the agency. More than 25 percent of the issuers said that they 
did not deal with the same primary Moody’s analyst year-to-year. It is important to stress 
that the significance of a issuer satisfaction with a totally solicited agency is revealed in 
the results of the 1997 survey. This independent survey conducted by the U.S.-based 
consulting firm of Cantwell & Co. asked the issuers to rate the performance of Duff and 
Phelps, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch IBCA, and Thomson BankWatch. The 
issuers selected Duff and Phelps’ as the clear favorite in most of the key categories 
(Cantwell 1998a).
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The respondents praised Duff and Phelps' analysts for their preparedness and 
more knowledge about rated companies, industries and credits than analysts from any 
other agency. Duff and Phelps also did a better job of explaining its methodology and 
its rating process than any other agency (Cantwell 1998a).
Reaction to Rating Downgrades and Upgrades
Akhigbe, Madura, and Whtye (1997) pointed out that if  the rating agencies had 
relevant information about firms not known by the market at the time of the rating change 
announcement, rating adjustments should induce a market response. The authors found 
significant negative valuation effects for rating downgrades.
In investigating the market reaction to bond downgradings, Bi and Levy (1993) 
concluded that the market could distinguish between firms with identical downgradings 
when one firm eventually filed for bankruptcy and the other firm did not file for 
bankruptcy. In other words, investors could discriminate between potentially failing and 
surviving firms. Similarly, Clark, Delva, and Foster (1993) investigated the relationship 
between bond rating changes and beta changes. The authors found a positive 
relationship between these two summary risk measures. This result also added to the 
credibility of the information content of rating changes.
Numerous studies have shown that the stock market reacted negatively to bond 
downgrade announcements. These studies include: Matolcsy and Lianto (1995); Hand, 
Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992); Cornell, Landsman, and Shapiro (1989), and Wansley 
and Clauetie (1985). Those studies also showed that downgrades (upgrades) tended to
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occur following periods ofnegative (positive) abnormal returns (Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1986), Wansley and Clauretie (1985).
An analysis of forecast revisions around rating changes has helped explain why 
the market has reacted to downgrades but not upgrades. Ederington and Goh (1998) 
provided evidence that the differential response to downgrades and upgrades occurred 
because issuers voluntarily released favorable information but they reluctantly release 
unfavorable information. Another finding is that the rating agencies spent more effort in 
detecting deteriorations in credit quality than in improvements in credit quality.
Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) analyzed the incremental information content ofbond 
rating revisions. The authors controlled for the information content of annual accounting 
income numbers. The results showed that only the announcement ofbond downgrades 
had this incremental information content. Ederington and Goh (1998) also revealed that 
the market reacted to downgrade information more quickly and efficiently than did 
analysts.
Chandra and Nayar (1998) tested whether downgrades (upgrades) occurred 
because the rating agencies revised their expectation o f future cash flows or because 
the rating agencies revised their evaluations of cash flows riskiness. Using analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, the authors determined whether commercial paper rating downgrades 
occurred because of changes in expected cash flows or changes in perceived riskiness. 
Chandra and Nayar found that both mild and severe commercial paper downgrades 
coincided with downward revisions in earnings expectations. Furthermore, severe 
downgrades also seemed to coincide with rises in perceived riskiness.
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Did earnings forecasts bring more information to the market?. In a related sense, 
how did ratings compare with earnings forecasts in terms of timeliness?
Stock analysts outnumbered rating agencies. In addition, analysts focused 
specifically on the outlook of the firm’s equity (Ederington and Goh 1998). However, the 
rating agencies had access to, and obtain feedback from, top management. Stock analysts 
did not have such access. Specifically, the rating agencies have access to such 
information as board meetings minutes, feedback on profit breakdowns by product, and 
new product plans (Ederington and Yawitz 1987). The rating agencies claim that even 
their own stock analysts do not have access to such information.
Clark, Foster, and Ghani (1997) expanded the investigation into the relationship 
between bond rating changes and analysts’ earnings forecasts. They showed that rating 
changes communicate valuable new information about small firms.
This study consisted of440 firms with downgraded bonds between 1986 and 1990 
which were reported in Standard & Poor’s Credit Week. The authors used the 
methodology described in Brous (1992) to test the response in analysts’ forecasts to 
downward bond ratings changes.
Clark, Foster and Ghani found that bond rating changes provide significant new 
information about the short-term prospects of small firms. Hence, the authors concluded 
that rating agencies diminished information asymmetries in the capital markets by 
communicating information about firms which tended to operate in less precise 
information environments.
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In addition, Clark, Foster, and Ghani found that analysts’ earnings forecasts were 
subject to optimism bias. O’Brien (1988) and Brous (1992) revealed this point. The 
authors showed that expected forecast revisions did not equal zero. Brous (1992) found 
a serial correlation for monthly forecast revisions because not all analysts updated their 
forecasts on a monthly basis. Hence, the authors concluded that revisions preceding an 
announcement month had utility in estimating forecast revisions. The number of 
downgrades in corporate bond ratings has exceeded the number of upgrades in recent 
years (Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay 1998).
Bond Ratines and Default Rates
Numerous studies have associated lower corporate bond ratings with higher 
probabilities of default Moody’s Investors Service (1994) summarized many of these 
results. Moody’s Investors Service provided a review of the default rates among rated 
issuers between 1970 and 1993. All bonds rated A and above had one-year default rates 
of zero. The one-year default rate increased to .2 percent for BBB issuers, and 1.8 and 
8.3 percent for BB and B rated issuers, respectively.
The Moody’s study calculated a weighted-average cumulative default rate. This 
default rate complemented the weighted-average marginal survival rates.
The default probabilities across Moody’s rating categories changed as the time 
horizon increased to five, ten, and fifteen years. Whereas the default probability increased 
with the time horizon for each rating category, the negative relation between default 
probability and ratings remained intact In a similar manner, Brand, Kitto, and Bahar
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(1994) conduct a historical default study covering bonds rated by Standard & Poor’s 
between 1981 and 1993. This study confirmed the conclusions drawn from the longer 
term study of Moody’s (1994).
In both studies, the probability of default rose most dramatically with a breach in 
the investment grade barrier. This result agreed with the historical importance of the 
investment grade/non-investment-grade distinction. The Moody’s (1994) study 
discovered a six times higher default probability for bonds rated BB than for those rated 
BBB over a five-year horizon. However, B-rated versus BB-rated issues had a much 
lower default probability (at 2.2), than did BBB-rated versus A-rated issues at (3.2). 
Cantor and Packer (1994) also summarized these results. Brand, Kitto and Bahar 
(1994), using the Standard & Poor’s data, produced ratios of 4.8 (BB versus BBB), 3.0 
(BBB versus A), and 1.9 (B versus BB), respectively.
Cantor and Packer (1994) pointed out that the agencies made changes based 
simply on the business-cycle considerations even though the frequency of defaults within 
rating categories clearly increased in recessions. Fons (1991) asserted that cyclical 
variations in Moody’s ratings on outstanding bonds could not explain most of the 
aggregate corporate bonds default rate. In addition, yield spreads between high- and 
low-rated bonds tended to increase during recessions. Market pricing therefore changed 
in a pattern consistent with a perceived increase in the default probabilities of lower rated 
issues relative to those of higher rated issues during recessions. Fons pointed out that, 
alternatively, the decline in economic growth may have merely reflected a concurrent 
increase in either the market’s dislike of default risk or other supply and demand factors.
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Fons also asserted that cyclical variability in short-tem default rates inevitably resulted 
from a longer term perspective. Long-term default probabilities at the different respective 
rating levels, therefore should have exhibited relative stability when they embed specific 
credit rating thresholds into both law and regulation (Cantor and Packer 1994). The 
authors used Moody’s data between 1970 and 1994 to review the progress of five-year 
cumulative default rates for investment-grade and non-investment-grade bonds. Non- 
investment-grade bonds initially spike in 1970. This spike originated from the default 
of Penn Central and twenty-six other railroad companies. Default rates also rose 
dramatically in 1971. Since then, the cumulative default rate within rating classes BBB 
and below has risen about threefold (Cantor and Packer 1994). From 1971 to 1989 the 
rate increased from 0.4 percent to 0.8 percent for A-rated bonds; 1.1 percent to 3.2 
percent for BBB-rated bonds; 5.1 percent to 19.7 percent for BB-rated bonds, and 11.1 
percent to 34.3 percent for B-rated bonds.
Cantor and Packer (1994) showed that though five-year default rates increased 
during the 1980s growth of the junk bond market, the deterioration in performance 
occurred in both investment grade and non-investment-grade bonds. The increasing trend 
in default rates originally related to the early 1980's recession, but it continued 
throughout the decade.
Bond Ratings for Banks 
Bond ratings mattered greatly to banks. The ratings have an important effect on 
counterparty exposure limits, letters of credit, and nondeposit sources of funds (Cantor
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and Packer 1994). International ratings have comprised a large percentage o f banking 
industry ratings.
Moody’s rated a significantly higher percentage of banks than did Standard and 
Poor’s. In 1994, Moody’s rated 64 percent of U.S. banks, whereas Standard and Poor’s 
rated 55 percent (Financial Times 1994).
Cantor and Packer (1994) pointed out that agencies appeared to disagree in their 
measurement of credit risks for banks more than in their risk measurement for other 
industries. However, Cantor and Packer’ study would have benefitted from the inclusion 
of Thomson Bankwatch ratings.
Ratings for banks in recent years have trended downward. In February 1995, 
Moody’s downgraded Morgan Guaranty trust from Aaa to Aal. This change had 
symbolic importance because for the first time since Moody’s began rating banks, no e 
U.S. holding company or subsidiary carried an AAA rating.
Bond Ratings for Insurance Firms
Two agencies, A.M. Best and Weiss Ratings, have specialized in rating insurance 
firms. A.M. has published both solicited and unsolicited ratings, whereas Weiss Ratings 
has published only unsolicited ratings.
In 1994, the General Accounting Office, at the request of Congress, completed a 
study on agency ratings for life/health insurers (General Accounting Office 1994). The 
report compared the ratings systems of the five life/health insurer raters of life/health 
insurers: A.M. Best, Duff and Phelps, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Weiss Ratings
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(Weiss) over the period 1989 to 1992. The report also determined which rating agency 
first reported the vulnerability of financially impaired or insolvent insurers.
The GAO report clearly showed that the agencies used different approaches and 
methods to rate insurer financial health. Weiss placed far less reliance than the other 
agencies on analysts’ judgment. Only Weiss rated more than half of all insurers. In 
addition, Moody’s and Weiss proved less likely than the other agencies to assign insurers 
their top ratings (General Accounting Office 1994).
The unique rating scales of Weiss and A.M. Best created conversion and 
comparison obstacles forthe GAO study. For example, an A+represented Weiss’ highest 
rating; A.M. Best’s second-highest rating; and Duff and Phelps, Standard and Poor’s , 
and Moody’s (converted) fifth-highest rating. In addition, during the GAO study, A.M. 
Best changed its rating system twice. A.M.. Best added new ratings during this time 
period and changed the existing ratings definition.
Agencies used the two-category secure/vulnerable classification in rating 
insurance firms. Among these five agencies, Weiss first assigned ‘Vulnerable” ratings 
in five of the six large insurance company failures. A.M. Best first assigned a 
“vulnerable” rating to the sixth largest insurance company that failed. However, the 
GAO study did not take into account the number of companies that each agency rated as 
vulnerable. Weiss rated more companies as vulnerable and therefore had a statistical 
advantage on the GAO’s tests.
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Rating Agencies and Stock Analysts 
Both rating agencies and stock analysts have evaluated publicly traded firms and 
communicated their findings to investors. Ederington and Goh (1998) examined the 
information that the rating agencies and the stock analysts provided and when they 
provided i t  The authors used changes in both actual earnings and analysts’ forecasts of 
future earnings around bond rating changes by Moody’s over the period 1984-1990.
Ederington and Goh (1998) stressed that bond ratings should communicate 
information to investors and that bad (good) news to bondholders did not necessarily 
constitute bad (good) news to stockholders. But Goh and Ederington (1993) provided 
evidence that most downgrades indicated a downward revision in the issuer’s prospective 
cash flows, which is bad news for both bondholders and stockholders.
In addition, analysts might have altered their earnings forecast, if they thought an 
unexpected rating change would affect the issuer’s future interest costs.
Declining Corporate Debt Ratines 
U.S. corporate debt ratings has been declining since 1970 . A comprehensive 
study by Lucas and Lonski (1992) of Moody’s corporate debt rating changes concludes 
that the credit quality of U.S. corporate debt decreased between 1970 and 1990. In 1970, 
Moody’s downgraded 21 issues and upgraded 23 issues. Over the next two decades, the 
number of bonds downgraded greatly exceeded the number upgraded. By 1990, the study 
shows that Moody’s downgraded 301 issues and upgraded only 61. This trend applies to 
both investment and non-investment grade bonds.
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However, the key question is whether these declining ratings signify a decrease 
in the credit quality of U.S. corporate debt. Two studies attribute the declining ratings 
to more stringent rating standards (Pender (1992) and Blume, Lim and MacKinlay 
(1998)). According to these two, there may be either no decline in credit quality or the 
decline is less than the data suggest
Blume, Lim and MacKinlay (1998) use data from 1978 to 1995 to determine 
whether a firm that maintains the same values for both its accounting measures and its 
equity risk measures over time receive a lower rating in 1995 than in past years. The 
authors utilize ordered probit analysis to find that the rating standards have become more 
stringent In fact the authors conclude that if it were not for the utilization of more 
stringent rating standards, the level ofbond ratings would actually have been higher than 
in the past
However, there are limitations to Blume, Lim and MacKinlay’s conclusions. The 
authors state that their results do not eliminate the possibility that the informational 
content of a specific variable has changed over time. An example of this point is that it 
is reasonable to believe that a firm had maintained the same leverage ratio over time may 
still find it more difficult to service its debt as the years went by.
Another limitation to their results is that other information not incorporated by the 
authors may indicate a decrease in credit quality. Such other information can be 
information privately available to the respective rating agencies (Blume, Lim, and 
MacKinlay 1998). The authors also limit their data to the ratings of Moody’s and S&P.
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CHAPTER 4
HYPOTHESES
This study has sought to determine the effect of solicitation and independence on 
corporate bond ratings. It has addressed the significant potential biases endemic to 
agencies who have provided strictly solicited ratings or a combination of solicited ratings 
and unsolicited ratings.
The independent agency, which accepted no fee from the issuer, should have 
provided true ratings free from biases. Previously, no one has published analyses on these 
issues. In order to test these issues, this study explored seven hypotheses. When a null 
hypothesis is rejected, multiple comparison tests are conducted.
The Ratings Difference Hypothesis
Testing for the effect of solicitation on corporate bond ratings required empirical 
research comparing the ratings of the four full-scale rating agencies, utilizing a recent 
month. Hypothesis One provided this test
Hypothesis One
H oi: The ratings of the four full-scale bond rating agencies did not differ.
38
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Hal: At least one of the four full-scale bond rating agencies’ (S&P, Moody’s 
Fitch IBCA and Duff & Phelps) had different ratings.
Non-rejection of Hoi would indicate that performing totally solicited ratings or 
both solicited and unsolicited ratings would not affect the determination of the particular 
agency’s ratings. Hence, a significant fee for a solicited rating would not bias the ratings 
upward. The fully solicited firm might more rapidly or more slowly upgrade or 
downgrade, but its ratings would not differ from those of the other full-scale bond rating 
agencies.
Rejection of Ho 1 would indicate a fee might have influenced the agency’s ratings. 
This would require multiple comparison tests to determine if  in fact one agency differed 
from the other three.
A sample selection bias might have caused higher ratings by Duff and Phelps 
and/or Fitch IBCA. Traditionally, issuers have sought the ratings of the two smaller full- 
scale bond rating agencies when they had significant expectation of improving upon the 
ratings of either Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s. However, this had more validity in the 
1970’s, 1980's and early 1990's. By March 1998, Duff and Phelps and Fitch IBCA had 
experienced dramatic growth. Issuers have in recent years sought the ratings of Duff and 
Phelps and Fitch IBCA without regard to significant expectation of improving upon the 
ratings of either Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s.
In addition, the multiple comparison test would determine if  the ratings differed 
between Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. Numerous studies have compared the ratings 
of these two firms in earlier years; this study utilizes the data through March, 1998. For
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the most part, the ratings o f these two agencies in the years prior to the Justice 
Department investigation which began in 1997, have not significantly differed. This 
present study therefore can help to determine whether the recent Justice Department 
investigation of Moody’s has caused its ratings to differ from Standard and Poor’s.
Upon rejection of Hoi, multiple comparison tests would also determine if  the 
ratings of Fitch IBCA differed from those of the other three full-scale bond rating 
agencies. Until 1996, Fitch did not perform unsolicited ratings. Hence, this study — 
using the data for March 1998 — has incorporated the use of unsolicited ratings for Fitch 
IBCA. If the ratings of Fitch IBCA differed from the ratings of Duff and Phelps, the use 
of unsolicited ratings by Fitch IBCA apparently contributed to this difference.
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s has published more unsolicited ratings than 
Fitch IBCA. Had they published lower ratings than Duff and Phelps, that could have 
provided evidence that solicitation led to inappropriately higher ratings. If the Standard 
and Poor’s and Moody’s ratings did not differ significantly, it would reinforce that 
conclusion.
If Fitch IBCA had issued lower ratings than Duff and Phelps, this result would 
provide evidence that the utilization of unsolicited ratings by Fitch IBCA since 1996 has 
produced more accurate ratings. This result could also have meant that Fitch IBCA 
punished issuers for not paying for its ratings. The timeliness hypotheses would provide 
insight in determining whether this occurred.
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The Timeliness Hypotheses 
The timeliness criterion crucially affected evaluations of solicitation and 
independence effects upon corporate bond ratings. Testing the impact of solicitation 
required comparison of the four full-scale bond rating agencies. Hypotheses Two and 
Three tested the timeliness criterion. Procedurally, the study had to first determine the 
result of Hypothesis One. Rejection of Hoi, would indicate a fully solicited agency 
ratings bias, even if Ho2 is not rejected.
Hypothesis Two
Ho2: All four full-scale bond ratings agencies upgraded their ratings at the same
time.
Ha2: At least one of the four full-scale bond rating agencies’ upgraded its ratings 
at an earlier time.
Non-rejection of Ho2 would indicate that a totally solicited agency might bias its 
ratings upwards, and reluctantly take a conspicuous role in doing so.
Rejection of Ho2 would indicate that a totally solicited agency not only biased 
its ratings upwards (depending upon the results of Hypothesis One) but it also willingly 
took a conspicuous role in doing so. Therefore, upon rejection of Ho2, multiple 
comparison tests would have determined if Duff and Phelps upgraded its ratings earlier.
Hypothesis Three
Ho3: The four full-scale bond ratings agencies all simultaneously downgraded 
their ratings at the same time.
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Ha3: At least one of the four full-scale bond rating agencies downgraded its 
ratings at an earlier time.
Non-rejection of Ho3 would indicate that a totally solicited rating agency did not 
hesitate to lower ratings. This result would provide important evidence that solicited or 
highly solicited agencies had incentives to provide true ratings if  it meant upsetting the 
issuers.
Rejection of Ho3 would create the need for multiple comparison tests. If 
Moody’s had downgraded earlier than DCR and Fitch IBCA, and if Standard and Poor’s 
also had downgraded earlier than DCR and Fitch IBCA, these results would have 
indicated that the hilly or predominantly solicited agency had incentives to only 
reluctantly provide true ratings. This result would also have indicated that DCR and 
Fitch hesitated to upset the issuers. Hence, Hypothesis Three served a crucial role in 
detennining the effect of solicitation on the timeliness of bond ratings
The Magnitude Hypotheses
The incorporation of magnitude of the upgrades and downgrades required testing 
another dimension of the effect of solicitation on corporate bond ratings. This test, 
although not as macro-oriented as timeliness, could provide additional evidence about 
the effect of solicitation. The magnitude criterion would indicate an upgrade and 
downgrade greater than one rank. For example a downgrade of three ranks in magnitude 
occured when Fitch IBCA downgraded Advanta Corporation from a BBB (11) to a BB 
(8) in February 1998. As another example, Duff and Phelps downgraded Aames
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Financial Corporation by four ranks in November 1998. Hypothesis Four and 
Hypothesis Five tested for magnitude upgrades and downgrades.
Hypothesis Four
Ho4: All four full-scale bond rating agencies provided an equivalent upgrade 
magnitude.
Ha4: At least one of the four full-scale bond rating agencies has a different 
upgrade magnitude.
Non-rejection of Ho4 would indicate that magnitude upgrades provided no 
additional evidence that solicitation affected corporate bond ratings.
Rejection of Ho4 would indicate the need for multiple comparison tests. If either 
or both S&P or Moody’s had a larger upgrade magnitude than DCR, this result would 
indicate that either S&P or Moody’s (or both) willingly led in not only upgrading an 
issuer first but that it also conspicuously did so. DCR would have had an incentive to 
less conspicuously provide an upgrade or downgrade magnitude, because DCR, alone 
among bond rating agencies, honored an issuer’s request to not rate its bonds. In 
addition, an entirely solicited agency such as DCR would have had an incentive to shift 
its ratings by only one level.
Hypothesis Five
HoS: The downgrade magnitudes of the four full-scale bond rating agencies did 
not significantly differ.
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Ha5: At least one o f the four full-scale bond rating agencies had a different 
downgrade magnitude.
Non-rejection of Ho5 would indicate a lack of additional evidence about the 
impact of solicitation on corporate bond ratings.
Rejection of Ho5 would indicate a need for multiple comparison tests. If 
Moody’s and/or S&P had a larger downgrade magnitude than DCR and/or Fitch, it 
would indicate that the fully or highly solicited agencies has more concern about 
alienating the issuers. This conclusion would have had special validity if  both Moody’s 
and S&P had a larger downgrade magnitude than DCR, and both Moody’s and S&P have 
a larger downgrade magnitude than Fitch. An absence of differences in downgrade 
magnitude between Moody’s and S&P, and between Fitch and DCR would also add 
validity.
The Independence Hypotheses
Hypothesis Six and Hypothesis Seven test whether fee-related independence had 
an effect on corporate bond ratings. The firm McCarthy, Crisnati, and Maffei (MCM), 
an independent agency, did not take a fee from the issuers.
Hypothesis Six
Ho6: The bond ratings of S&P, Moody’s, and MCM did not differ.
Ha6: At least one of the three bond rating agencies’ (S&P, Moody’s, and MCM) 
published different ratings.
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Acceptance (or non-rejection) of Ho6 would indicate that independence did not 
affect bond ratings. This result would indicate an absence of potential conflictd of 
interest when the issuer compensated the agency. Also this would indicate that an 
independent agency could not claim advantage in providing the true rating.
Hence, non-rejection of Ho6 would obviate the need for additional research on 
Egan-Jones, a “modern-day MCM” and an independent bond rating agency.
Rejection of Ho6 would indicate that the independence criterion would have 
affected corporate bond ratings. This would have created the need for multiple 
comparison tests. Lower ratings by MCM than those of both Moody’s and S&P would 
have reinforced this conclusion as would identical ratings by Moody’s and S&P.
Rejection of Ho6 would indicate a potential conflict of interest when the bond 
issuer compensated the rating agency. The independence could have allowed the 
independent agency to express themselves more forcefully than the giant agencies. The 
independent agency could have more easily asserted that a particular issuer had a positive 
or negative effect on bondholders. This result would have allowed the independent 
agency to claim that subscribers should only pay for the agency services. A fully 
unsolicited agency would not have had the biases endemic to the agencies that provide 
both solicited ratings and unsolicited ratings.
Rejection of Ho6 would create a need to do research on an active independent 
agency such as Egan-Jones. MCM originated in 1975, Xerox Financial Services 
subsequently acquired it, and its fixed income rating and research service merged into 
Duff and Phelps in 1991.
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The rejection of H06 would indicate that the new independent rating agency, 
Egan-Jones could have charged higher prices for its research, and this would have 
enhanced its financial viability. Approximately eighty percent of S&P’s revenue came 
from issuer fees. Rejection o f Ho6 would also have indicated that the investment 
community could have questioned the accuracy of the ratings ofthe giant agencies. S&P 
and Moody’s would likely face additional competition from newer independent agencies. 
This could have caused heavy scrutiny of Moody’s and S&P. The threat of legal 
liability for both S&P and Moody’s could have materialized as a result of that scrutiny. 
Hypothesis Seven
Ho7: S&P, Moody’s, and MCM all upgraded their ratings at the same time.
Ha7: At least one of the three bond rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, and MCM) 
upgraded its ratings at an earlier time.
Non-rejection of Ho7, would indicate the independent agency’s willingness to 
conspicuously adjust their ratings. The independent agency could not claim that the big 
agencies followed the little independent agency and the customers of MCM would not 
have benefitted on bond upgrades because no one would have provided that advanced 
word.
Rejection of Ho7 would create the need for multiple comparison tests. If MCM 
had changed it upgrade ratings earlier, this result would have indicated that the customers 
of the independent agency received superior service as these customers received 
advanced word on bond upgrades. Moody’s and S&P would likely have faced more 
competition would from newer independentagencies. These agencies could have attained
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financial viability by charging higher fees for its ratings and publications. Inaccurate 
ratings provided by Moody’s and S&P could have exposed these two agencies to costly 
legal liability. Investors could have lost confidence in the timeliness of the ratings of the 
two larger agencies. In addition, more appeals of the ratings given by S&P and Moody’s 
would likely have occurred.
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CHAPTER 5
METHODS AND SAMPLE
The objective of this study is to determine the effect of solicitation and 
independence on corporate bond ratings. An interesting aspect of this study is whether 
there are significant potential biases endemic to agencies that provide strictly solicited 
ratings or a combination o f solicited and unsolicited ratings.
The bond ratings assigned by all of the agencies indicated the likelihood of 
default or delayed interest payment. The ratings ranked the risks of default from 
extremely safe to highly speculative. The agencies have long had their own system of 
symbols. Some have used letters, some have used numbers, and some have used both. 
Gradually, however, a correspondence among the major agencies' ratings has emerged. 
In order to provide more distinct rating gradations to help investors distinguish more 
carefully among issuers, the agencies started attaching plus and minus symbols to their 
ratings. In 1973, Fitch became the first agency to start using the plus/minus system. 
Standard and Poor’s followed in 1974. Moody’s implemented this system in 1982.
In addition, the grading schemes have undergone other modifications. One 
modification, the addition of a “credit watch” category, denoted that rating is under 
review.
48
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The ratings systems employed by S&P, Moody’s, Fitch IBCA, Duff and Phelps 
(DCR) and MCM employed identical ratings based on a letter scale. However, Moody’s 
utilized a unique ratings code. Table 2 standardizes the letter scales for all five agencies 
into numbers in order to facilitate the nonparametric tests. Table 2 displays these ratings 
conversions. The rating agency definitions for the Table 2 ratings are synthesized in 
Table 3.
Table 2: Ratings Converted to Numbers
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Table 2: (continued)





Table 3: Definitions of Ratings
Rating Definition
19 Highest credit quality. The risk factors are negligible and are only 
slightly higher than for risk-fiee U.S. Treasury debt.
18 High credit quality.
17 The protection factors are strong. Risk is modest
16 Risk may vary from time to time because of economic conditions.
15 The protection factors are average but adequate.
14 The risk factors are more variable.
13 The risk factors are especially variable in period of economic stress.
12 The protection factors are below average but still considered 
sufficient.
11 Considerable variability in risk.
10 Considerable variability in risk especially during economic cycles.
9 Below investment grade but deemed to meet obligations.
8 Present or prospective financial protection factors fluctuate.
7 Overall quality moves up or down frequently.




6 Below investment grade and possessing risk that obligations will not 
be met when due.
5 Financial protection factors will fluctuate widely according to 
economic cycles, industry conditions and/or company fortunes.
4 Potential exists for frequent changes in the rating. Considerable risk 
that obligations will not be met when due.
3 Well below investment-grade securities. Considerable uncertainty 
exists as to timely payment of principal and interest
2 Protection factors are narrow and risk can be substantial with 
unfavorable economic/industry conditions, and/or with unfavorable 
company developments.
1 Defaulted debt obligations. Issuer failed to meet scheduled principal 
and/or interest payments.
Data for Hypotheses One thru Five 
Hypotheses One, Two, Three, Four, Five compared ratings from the S&P Bond 
Guide, Moody's Bond Record and the Internet sites for Fitch IBCA and Duff and Phelps 
forthe years 1993>1998. Hypothesis One utilized the March 1998 rating guides for each 
agency. The data for the four agencies' ratings for the years 1993 to 1998 were 
formulated into an 140-page spreadsheet.
Data for Hypotheses Six and Seven 
The data used to test Hypothesis Six, whether the ratings of Moody’s, S&P and 
MCM differed came from a sample o f203 firms rated by Moody’s, S&P, and MCM in
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September 1989. The data for Hypothesis Six were obtained from MCM Fixed Income 
Ratinos - Sept 30, 1989, Moody's Bond Record - Sept 1989 and Standard and Poor's 
Corporation Bond Guide - Sept 1989. The data for Hypothesis Seven were obtained from 
MCM Ratings Perspectives including Eleven Year Comparison of MCM. Moodv’s and 
S&P Ratings (1989). This perspective is a comparison of MCM, Moody's and S&P 
among issuers from 1978 to 1989.
The issues for all seven hypotheses consisted of long-term bonds (which included 
debentures), mortgage bonds (secured), and unsecured bonds and notes. The inclusion 
of these bonds broadened the sample to increase external validity.
The sample includes only bonds currently traded whose maturity date is after 
January 1999. Hence, all of the bonds are non-expired.
Methodology
The Friedman Two-Way Analysis of Variance by Ranks test is applied to test 
Hypotheses One, Two, Three, Four, Five, and Hypothesis Seven. The Aligned Ranks test 
is used to test Hypothesis Six. When an hypothesis is rejected, the study employed a 
multiple-comparison procedure for use with the particular test. This study used the 
randomized complete block design to test all seven hypotheses.
For Hypothesis One, the randomized complete block design block is employed 
on 94 issuers. The randomized complete block design is also used to test Hypotheses 
Two, Three, For, Five, Six, and Seven. This blocking design effectively eliminated 
extraneous noise.
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Hypothesis One
There are 94 issuers that were rated by four full-scale agencies in March 1998 
which comprise the sample used to test Hypothesis One.
Three assumptions must be met in order to effectively utilize the Friedman two- 
way analysis of variance by ranks test The first assumption deals with the data 
consisting of b mutually independent samples (blocks) of size k. The data for Hypothesis 
One consist of 94 mutually independent blocks of size of four units. In Table 4, the rows 
(issuers) are called blocks and the columns (agencies) are called treatments. The ranks 
are based on a 1.0 to 4.0 scale adjusted forties, with the rank 1.0 being the agency given 
the highest rating and the rank 4.0 being the agency given the lowest rating within the 
respective block.
The second assumption is that there is no interaction between blocks and 
consumers. This assumption is met. The third assumption is that the observations 
within each block are in rank order. The agencies within each block (issuer) are in rank 
order.
Table 4: Ranks for Hypothesis One
Duff Fitch Moody S&P
AAMES FINANCIAL 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5
ADVANTA CORP 1.0 2.5 4.0 2.5
ALABAMA POWER 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0
ALLIEDSIGNAL 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5
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Table 4: (continued)
Duff Fitch Moody S&P
APPALACHIAN POWER CO 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0
ARISTAR INC 1.5 1.5 4.0 3.0
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE 4.0 2.5 2.5 1.0
ASSOCIATES CORP 2.5 1.0 4.0 2.5
AT&T CAPITAL CORP 2.0 3.5 1.0 3.5
BALLY TOTAL FITNESS 1.0 2.0 4.0 3.0
BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO 1.5 3.5 3.5 1.5
BANKAMERIC A CORP 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0
BANKERS TRUST CORP 2.5 1.0 4.0 2.5
BARNETT BANKS INC 1.5 3.5 1.5 3.5
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 1.5 1.5 4.0 3.0
CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELECTRIC 1.5 3.5 3.5 1.5
CHASE MANHATTAN 3.5 1.0 2.0 3.5
CHRYSLER CORP 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0
CHRYSLER FINANCIAL 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0
CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC CO 4.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
CITGO PETROLEUM CORP 2.5 2.5 1.0 4.0
CITICORP 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0
CITIZENS UTILITIES CO 2.5 2.5 4.0 1.0
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.0
CMS ENERGY CORP 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0
COLUMBUS SOUTHERN POWER 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
COMMERCIAL CREDIT CO 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0
CONSUMERS ENERGY CO 3.0 1.5 4.0 1.5
DONALDSON LUFKIN & JENRETTE 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5
EL PASO ELECTRIC CO 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0
ENRON CORP. 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0
ENSERCH CORP 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0
FINOVA CAPITAL CORP 1.5 1.5 4.0 3.0
FLEET FINANCIAL GROUP INC 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0
FORD MOTOR CO 3.5 1.5 1.5 3.5
FRONTIER CORP 3.5 1.5 3.5 1.5
FRONTIER ASSOCIATES 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
GTE CORP 3.0 1.5 4.0 1.5
GULF POWER CO 1.5 1.5 4.0 3.0
HELLER FINANCIAL INC 1.5 1.5 3.0 4.0
HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORP 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5
HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL INC 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0
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Table 4: (continued)
Duff Fitch Moody S&P
HOUSTON INDUSTRIES 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5
IBM CREDIT CORP. 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0
ILLINOIS POWER CO 1.0 2.5 2.5 4.0
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO 1.0 2.5 2.5 4.0
INDIANAPOLIS POWER & LIGHT CO 2.5 1.0 2.5 4.0
INTERPOOL INC 2.0 1.0 4.0 3.0
ITT CORPORATION 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.0
nr INDUSTRIES INC. 1.5 1.5 3.0 4.0
J.P. MORGAN & CO INC 2.5 1.0 4.0 2.5
KENTUCKY POWER CO 4.0 3.0 1.0 2.0
LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0
LEHMAN BROTHERS INC 1.5 3.0 4.0 1.5
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0
MATTEL INC. 1.5 3.5 3.5 1.5
MDU RESOURCES GROUP INC 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
MELLON BANK CORP 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5
MERRILL LYNCH & CO 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5
MICHIGAN CONSOLIDATED GAS CO 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
MISSISSIPPI POWER CO 4.0 1.0 2.5 2.5
MONTANA POWER CO 3.5 1.5 3.5 1.5
NABISCO INC 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
NATIONAL CITY CORP 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
NEVADA POWER CO 3.5 2.0 3.5 1.0
NORAM ENERGY CORP 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0
NORTHERN INDIANA 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0
NORTHWEST PIPELINE 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0
NORWEST FINANCIAL INC 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
OHIO POWER CO 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
PACIFICORP 1.5 3.5 1.5 3.5
PANENERGY CORP 4.0 1.0 2.5 2.5
PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE 4.0 1.0 3.0 2.0
PDV AMERICA INC 2.5 1.0 2.5 4.0
PHH CORPORATION 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER 3.5 1.5 1.5 3.5
PSI ENERGY INC 2.0 1.0 3.5 3.5
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS 1.0 2.5 4.0 2.5
REPUBLIC NEW YORK 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0
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Duff Fitch Moody S&P
RJR NABISCO INC 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0
SOUTHERN INDIANA GAS & ELECTRIC 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
CMC SECURITIES CORP 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 1.5 1.5 4.0 3.0
FIRST REPUBLIC BANK 1.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
GEON COMPANY 1.5 1.5 3.5 3.5
MEGO MORTGAGE CORP 2.5 1.0 4.0 2.5
PECO ENERGY CO 3.5 1.5 3.5 1.5
PEOPLES GAS LIGHT 1.0 2.0 3.5 3.5
RYLAND ACCEPTANCE CO 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0f
o 




R s*p= 2 5
8.5
Hypothesis Two
The ranked data for Hypothesis Two in Table 5 consist of 22 blocks of size four 
units. There are twenty two cases where there was a four-way tie in the rating given 
before the four agencies upgraded their ratings. If a particular issuer had two four-way 
ties before the agencies upgraded, the most recent four-way tie was the tie that was used 
in the sample.
Table 5 shows there is no interaction between the blocks and the treatments. 
Also, the observations within each block are order of magnitude ranked. The ranks are 
based on a 1.0 to 4.0 scale, adjusted for ties. The rank 1.0 is the agency that upgrades 
fastest and the rank 4.0 is the agency that is the slowest to upgrade.
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Duff Fitch Moody S&P
Allied 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Arizona Public 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Central 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Chrysler Corp 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Chrysler Finance 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Citicorp 1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
CMS 1.0 3.5 2.0 3.5
Georgia Power 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
IBM 1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
Lockheed 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Long Island 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Mattel 1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
MDU Resources 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Michigan Consol 1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
Nabisco 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Occidental 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Ohio Power 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Panenergy 2.0 1.0 4.0 3.0
Panhandle 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
PHH 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
PSI 2.0 1.0 3.0 4.0
Peoples 1.0 2.0 4.0 3.0
RoufT̂ O.S RFitch=65.0 Rmoo=45.0 Rs+p=49.5
Hypothesis Three
There are 37 independent blocks (issuers) of size four in Table Six. There is no 
interaction between blocks and treatments. The observations within each block are in 
rank order.
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The ranks in Table 6 are based on a 1.0 to 4.0 scale adjusted forties. The rank 1.0 
is given to the agency that downgrades fastest and the rank 4.0 is given to the agency that 
downgrades slowest
Table 6: Ranks for Hypothesis Three
Duff Fitch Moody S&P
Aames Financial 4.0 1.0 2.5 2.5
Appalachian 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Aristar 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Bank America 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Capital One 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Citgo 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Citizen Utilities 1.0 4.0 3.0 2.0
Cleveland Electric 1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
Consumers Energy 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Donaldson Lufkin 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
El Paso Electric 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Enron 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Finova 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Fleet 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Frontier 1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
Gulf Power 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Heller 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Household Finance 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
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Duff Fitch Moody S&P
Household Internal 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Houston Ind 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
ITT 1.0 4.0 3.0 2.0
ITT Industries 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Lehman Holdings 3.5 35 1.0 2.0
Mellon 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Merrill 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Noram 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Northern Indiana 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Northwest Pipeline 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Potomoc 1.0 4.0 3.0 2.0
Republic 4.0 1.0 2.5 2.5
RJR 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Southern Cal 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Southern Ind 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Electronic 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Fifth Third 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Geon 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Peco 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
R oufl^H S .O R f,«*= 1 2 7 .0 . Rmoo=58.0 Rs*P=67.0
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Hypothesis Four
The ranked data for Hypothesis Four in Table 7 consist of 22 blocks of four units. 
There is no interaction between blocks and means. The observations within each block 
are in rank order.
There are 22 cases where there was a four-way tie in the rating given before the 
agencies upgraded their ratings. If a particular issuer had two four-way ties before the 
agencies upgraded, the tie in the most recent year was the tie selected to test Hypothesis 
Four(shown in Table Seven). Upgrades of greater than one level are now implemented 
based on the magnitude of upgrade.
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Duff Fitch Moody S&P
Allied 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Arizona Public 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Central 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Chrysler Corp 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Chrysler Finance 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Citicorp 1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
CMS 1.0 3.5 2.0 3.5
Georgia Power(2) 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Georgia Power 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
IBM 1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
Lockheed 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Long Island(3) 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Long Island 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Long Island 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Mattel 1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
MDU 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Michigan Consol 1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
Nabisco 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Occidental 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Ohio Power 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Panenergy (3) 2.0 1.0 4.0 3.0
Panenergy 2.0 1.0 4.0 3.0
Panenergy 2.0 1.0 4.0 3.0
Panhandle(3) 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Panhandle 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
Panhandle 4.0 1.0 2.0 3.0
PHH 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
PSI 2.0 1.0 3.0 4.0
Peoples 1.0 2.0 4.0 3.0
R o u f n ^ . O R f i tc h = 7 4 . 5 RMoo~63.0 Rs*p=68.5
Hypothesis Five
There are 37 independent blocks (issuers) of size four units in Table Eight There 
is no interaction between blocks and treatments. The observations within each block are 
in rank order.
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The ranks in Table Eight are based on a 1.0 to 4.0 scale, adjusted forties. In Table 
8, the rank 1.0 is given to the agency that downgrades fastest and the rank 4.0 is given to 
the agency that downgrades the slowest Downgrades of greater than one level are now 
implemented based on the magnitude of downgrade.
Table 8: Ranks for Hypothesis Five
Duff Fitch Moody S&P
Aames(2) 4.0 1.0 2.5 2.5
Aames 4.0 1.0 2.5 2.5
Appalachian 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Aristar 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Bank America 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Capital One 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Citgo 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Citizen Utilities 1.0 4.0 3.0 2.0
Cleveland Electric 1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
Consumers Energy 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Donaldson Lufkin 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
El Paso Electric 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Enron 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Finova 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Fleet 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Frontier 1.0 4.0 2.0 3.0
Gulf Power 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Heller 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Household Finance 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Household Inter(2) 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Household Inter 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
ITT(2) 1.0 4.0 3.0 2.0
ITT 1.0 4.0 3.0 2.0
ITT Ind 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Lehman 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Mellon 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Merrill 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Noram 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Northern Indiana 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Northwest Pipeline 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Potomoc 1.0 4.0 3.0 2.0
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Table 8: (continued)
Duff Fitch Moody S&P
Republic 4.0 1.0 2.5 2.5
RJR 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Southern Cal(2) 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Southern Cal 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Southern Ind 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
Electronic 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Fifth Third(2) 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Fifth Third 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Geon 3.5 3.5 1.0 2.0
Peco 3.5 3.5 2.0 1.0
RDuff=130.0 Rpiicii= 142.0 Rmoo=8 1.5 Rs+p=73.5
Hypothesis Six
The aligned ranks test is implemented to test Hypothesis Six as the original 1 to 
19 ratings can be maintained only if three treatment (agencies) are utilized (Sprent 1993). 
Table 9 displays ratings data for the first five blocks (issuers) of the 203 blocks (issuers) 
in March 1989.
Table 9: Mini Sample for Hypothesis Six
S&P Moo MCM
Abbott Laboratories 18 18 18
Allied Corp 14 14 13
Allied Signal 14 14 13
ALCOA 14 14 13
American Express 17 17 16
Amoco 19 19 18
Archer-Daniels 17 15 16
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The assumptions for the aligned tanks test hold. The data consist of203 mutually 
independent blocks o f size three units. There is no interaction between blocks and 
treatments. The additional assumption for the Aligned Ranks test is that the observations 
within each block are ranked in order of magnitude. The observations for the data used 
to test Hypothesis Six are ranked within each block in order of magnitude.
The hypothesis to test for differences is based on medians:
Ho: Ml = M2 = M3 
H I: at least one differs
There is no interaction between the blocks and treatments. The observations 
within each block are clearly in rank order.
If the null hypothesis is rejected, a lack of randomness distributed over the 
columns (respective bond rating agency rating) in each block should have occurred.
Hypothesis Seven
The Friedman Two-Way Analysis o f Variance by Ranks Test is utilized as the 
ranks instead of the original 1 to 19 ratings determine which agency upgraded fastest 
The ranks derived from the original ratings are used for this test o f upgrade timeliness. 
An illustration of the blocks and treatments (agencies) for Hypothesis Seven is shown 
in Table 10.
There is no interaction between blocks and treatments. The observations within 
each block are in rank order.
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The ranked data for Hypothesis Seven consists o f 81 blocks of size three units. 
There are 81 cases in which there is a three-way tie before the agencies upgraded their 
ratings. If a particular issuer had two three-way ties before the agencies upgraded, the 
most recent three-way tie was the tie included in the sample for Hypothesis Seven.
Table 10: Illustration of Ranks for Hypothesis Seven
S&P Moody's MCM
Alabama Power 2.0 3.0 1.0
Baltimore Gas 1.5 1.5 3.0
Boston Edison 2.0 3.0 1.0
California Electric 3.0 1.0 2.0
Con Edison 3.0 1.5 1.5
Consolidated Oil & Gas 1.0 2.0 3.0
Consumers Power 2.5 2.5 1.0
Dallas Power & Light 1.5 1.5 3.0
Dayton Power & Light 2.0 1.0 3.0
Delmarva Power & Light 3.0 2.0 1.0
Detroit Edison 2.0 3.0 1.0
DukePwoer 2.0 1.0 3.0
El Paso Electric 2.5 2.5 1.0
Florida Power 3.0 2.0 1.0
Gas Service Co. 1.0 2.0 3.0
Georgia Power 1.0 3.0 2.0
Houston Light & Power 1.5 1.5 3.0
Idaho Power 2.5 2.5 1.0




Illinois Power 1.0 2.0 3.0
Indiana Gas 1.5 3.0 1.5
Indiana Michigan Power 2.0 3.0 1.0
Indianapolis Power & Light 1.0 3.0 2.0
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS
This study examines the effect ofsolicitation and independence on corporate bond 
ratings. The major potential biases endemic towards agencies who have provided strictly 
solicited ratings or a combination of solicited ratings and unsolicited ratings are 
addressed.
An independent agency, which has accepted no fee from the issuer, should have 
provided true ratings free from biases. No one previously has published analyses of these 
issues.
Hypothesis One
The Friedman Two-Way Analysis o f Variance by Ranks test is calculated by first 
converting the original observations to ranks. The Friedman test detects departures from 
expectation under Ho on the basis of the sums of the ranks by column.
The computational formula for the Friedman Two-way analysis of Variance by 
ranks Test is calculated as:
= [12 /(94)(4)(5)] * [(208)2+(186.5)2 + (287)2 + (258.5)2] - 3(94X5)
67
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X2r = [12 /1880] * (43264 + 34782.25 + 82369 + 66822.25) - 1410
X2r = [12/1880] *(227237.5)-1410
X2r = (0.006382)(227237.5) - 1410
X2r = 1450.43-1410
X2r = 40.43
If X2r <= X2 ( l 'a ; k-lX do not reject Ho 
X2r > X2(l-« ;k -l), reject Ho
For a  = 0.10, need x2 (0.90,3) = 6.25 
X2r = 40.43 > 6.25, reject Ho at a  = 0.1 
at least one agency gives different ratings than the others.
Multiple Comparison Procedure
| Rj - Rj11 >= Z [bK(K+l) / 6]1/2 
a = 0.1 
K = 4
0.1/4 = 0.25 Z =  1.96
(1.96) [(94X4X5)/6]1/2 = (1.96) [1880/6]1/2





208.0 186.5 287.0 258.5
1208.0-I86.5| = 21.5 <34.6
1208.0 - 287.0| = 79.0 > 34.6 * [Duff & Fitch]
1208.0 - 258.5| = 50.5 > 34.6 * [Duff & S&P]
1186.5 - 287.0| = 100.5 > 34.6 * [Fitch & Moody’s]
1186.5 - 258.5| = 72.0 > 34.6 * [Fitch & S&P]
|287.0-258.5| =28.5 <34.6
The six pairs computed show exactly where the differences are located. The 
multiple comparison procedure for use with the Friedman test shows significance 
differences among the four agencies.
The ratings of Duff and Moody’s, Duff and S&P, Fitch and Moody’s, Fitch and 
S&P are dissimilar. Neither Duff and Fitch nor Moody’s and S&P gave different ratings. 
Duff had higher ratings than S&P, Duff had higher ratings than Moody’s, Fitch had 
higher ratings than S&P, and Fitch had higher ratings thanMoody’s. Duff and Phelps had 
higher ratings than both S&P and Moody’s, and Fitch had higher ratings than both S&P 
and Moody’s.
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Hypothesis Two
To calculate the test the sums of the ranks Rj in each column is obtained. The 
Friedman test detects departures from expectation under Ho on the basis o f the sums of 
the ranks by column.
The computational formula o f the Friedman test statistic is:
X\ = {12/(22X4)(5)}{ (60.5)2 + (65? +  (45? +(49.5?>- 3(22X5)
= (12/440X3660 + 4225 + 2025 +2450) - 330 
= 0.027 (12360)-330 
X2r = 333.72-330 = 0.72 
If x2r <= X20 -a> K-l), do not reject Ho2 
If X2r > X20 -a ,  K-l), reject Ho2
For a = 0.1 need x2(0.9,3) = 6.25
X2r=  0.72 < 6.25 do not reject Ho2 at a  = 0.1. Cannot reject Ho2 that all four 
bond rating agencies upgraded their rating at the same time.
Hypothesis Three
The Friedman test detects departures from expectation under Ho on the basis of 
the sums of the ranks by column. The computational formula for the Friedman test 
statistic is:
x2, = {12/(37X4X5)} { (118J2 + (127X + (SSf « 6 7 f) -  3(37X5)
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= (12/740X13924 + 16129 + 3364 + 4489) - 555 
= 0.0162 (37906)-555 
X2r = 614.07 - 555 = 59.07 
If x2r <= X2(l-a» K-l), do not reject Ho3 
IfX2r > X2( l“a » K-l), reject Ho3
For a = 0.1 need x2(0 .93) = 6.25
X2r= 59.07 > 6.25, reject Ho3 at a  = 0.1, at least one agency downgraded its 
ratings at an earlier time.
Multiple Comparison Procedure
| Rj - Rj* | = Z [bK(K+l) / 6 ]1/2
a = 0.1 
K = 4
0.1/4 = 0.25 Z =  1.96
(1.96) [(37X4X5)/6],y2 = (1.96) (123.3)1/2
= 21.76
Duff Fitch Moody’s S&P
118.0 127.0 58.0 67.0
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|118-127| = 9 <21.76
|118-58| =60 >21.76* [D uff* Moody’s]
|118 - 67| = 51 > 21.76 * [Duff & S&P]
1127 - 58| = 69 > 21.76 * [Fitch & Moody’s]
|127 - 67| = 60 > 21.76 * [Fitch & S&P]
|58-67| = 9  <21.76
Duff and Moody, Duff and S&P, Fitch and Moody’s, Fitch and S&P downgraded 
at different times. Duff and Fitch, Moody’s and S&P downgraded at same time. Moody’s 
downgraded earlier than Duff and Fitch. S&P downgraded earlier than Duff and Fitch.
Hypothesis Four
The Friedman test for Hypothesis Four detects departures from expectation under 
Ho on the basis of the magnitudes of the sums of the ranks by column. The 
computational formula for the test statistic is computed as:
X\ = {12/(22)(4X5)} { (84f  + (74.5 f  + (63)2 +(68.5f } -  3(22X5)
= (12/440)(7056 + 5550 + 3969 +4692) - 330 
= 0.027 (21267)-330 
X2r = 574 - 330 
X2r — 244 reject Ho
(1.96) [(22X4X5)/6],/2 = 1.96(8.56)
= 16.78




84 74.5 63 68.5
{84 - 74.5| = 9.5 <16
|84 - 63| = 21 >16
|84-68.5| = 15 <16
|74.5-63| = 11.5 <16
|74.5-68.5| = 6 <16
|63 - 68.5| = 5.5 <16
Moody’s has a larger upgrade magnitude than Duff. None of the other combinations 
differed significantly.
Hypothesis Five
The Friedman test detects departures from expectation under Ho on the basis of 
the magnitudes ofthesum softhe ranks by column. The computational formula of the 
test statistic is computed as:
X \ = {12/(37)(4X5)} { (130)2 + (142)2 + (81.5)2 -K73.5)2}- 3(37)(5)
= (12/740)(16900 + 20164 + 6642 + 5402) - 555 
= 0.0162 (49108) - 555 
X2r -  795 - 555 = 240 
Reject Ho5




Duff  Fitch__________ Moody’s__________S&P
130 142 813 73.5
|130-142| =12 <21.76
|130 - 81.5| = 48.5 > 21.76 * [Duff & Moody’s]
|130 - 73.5| = 56.5 > 21.76 * [Duff & S&P]
|142 - 81.5| = 60.5 > 21.76 * [Fitch & Moody’s]
(142 - 73.5| = 68.5 > 21.76 * [Fitch & S&P]
|81.5-73.5| = 8 <21.76
At a = 0.1, Moody’s has a larger downgrade magnitude than both Duff and Fitch. S&P 
has a larger downgrade magnitude than both Duff and Fitch. There is no difference at a  
= 0.1 between S&P and Moody’s. There is no difference between Fitch and Duff.
Hypothesis Six
The results would have rejected at the .05 level of significance if the x \ test 
statistic computed from the data exceeded the critical value of 5.991 for k-1 = 2 degrees 
of freedom.
The empirical research produced the following results for the Rj's:
R(s&p) = 456.75
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R(moody’s) = 489.23 
R(mcm) = 269.19 
X2r=  128.7
128.7 > 5.991, hence, a rejection of Ho6 at the .05 level of significance. Clearly, 
the ties adjustment will also lead to rejection of Ho6 as adjusting for ties inflates xV
One should note that the F large sample approximation provides a more accurate 
test statistic (Iman and Davenport 1980). The F approximation uses k-1 and (b-l)(k-l) 
degrees of freedom. The approximation always uses k-1 as its degrees o f freedom 
regardless of the number of blocks. This fact could be partially explain the inaccuracy 
of the x2r approximation. However, only with small sample sizes did the x2r large 
sample approximation prove grossly inaccurate. Increased accuracy in the size of the 
critical region resulted from the use of F or J approximations formulated by Iman and 
Davenport (1980).
The F statistic ofF = 145.32 with b=203 and k=3 caused a rejection of Ho. When 
testing for differences in ratings of the three firms, 1-19 ratings provided a great deal of 
information. Hence, the aligned ranks test proved crucial for measuring ratings 
differences for the three bond rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, and MCM).
Clearly the F-test provided the most powerful test, with little or no information 
loss. However, the ratings may not be normally distributed, thereby restricting its use. 
Outliers also could have affected the F-test.
The aligned ranks test, far superior to the Friedman for this application, made use 
of the original data and the differences in original utility. The aligned ranks test
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involved subtracting from each observation within a block some measure oflocation, (the 
block mean or median). The resulting differences, called aligned observations, ranked 
from 1 to kb relative to each other, kept their identities with respect to the proper block 
and treatment combination.
If all three bond rating firms gave approximately the same ratings, one would 
expect each of the blocks to receive about the same sequence of aligned ranks. If Ho6 is 
not rejected, it would have made treatment rank totals approximately equal.
Without ties, the aligned rank test statistic for the RCB has Ri = rank total of the 
ith block and Rij = rank total of the jth treatment The study compared test statistic T for 
significance with the critical value having k-1 degrees of freedom. A mini random 
sample (Table 11) of the first six firms beginning with the letter nCn illustrates the 
utilization of the aligned ranks test to test for differences in the bond agency ratings.
Table 11: Mini Random Sample for Hypothesis Six
Block (bond S&P Moody's MCM
Catepillar Inc. 13 14 13
Centel Corp 12 12 11
Central Power 13 15 12
Champion Inc 11 12 12
Chase Manhattan 14 12 11
Chemical Banking 14 12 11
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The following listing displays the block means:
1 2 3 4 5 6
1333 11.67 12.67 11.67 12.33 1233
The aligned observations are presented in Table 12. For the sample of 203 
blocks, T = 21.64 and with k-1 = 2 degrees of freedom. Hence, we rejected Ho6 and 
concluded that at least one of the three bond rating agencies gave different ratings.









Because of Ho6's rejection, one needs to know which of the bond rating agencies 
differed from the others. Choosing an experimentwise error rate of <*=.10, withk=3;Z 
represented the value from the normal distribution table. Hence, Z = 2.05. The formula 
is used for the large number of blocks (because b =203) declared R(Moody’s), R(S&P) 
and R(MCM) significantly different is
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(|Rj-iyi>z).
The right-hand side o f the identity is 41.3, with rank totals of: 
Moody’s   S&P MCM
456.75 489.23 269.99
1456.75 - 489.23| = 32.48 < 41.3
{489.23 - 269.99| = 219.24 > 41.3 * [S&P & MCM]
1456.75 - 269.99| = 186.76 > 413 * [Moody’s & MCM]
Thus, we concluded that MCM and Moody's gave different ratings and MCM and 
S&P gave different ratings but Moody's and S&P did not. MCM gave lower ratings 
than either S&P or Moody’s.
Hypothesis Seven
The Friedman Two-way Analysis of Variance is used to test Hypothesis Seven. 
Had the finding rejected Ho7, a multiple-comparison procedure would be used with the 
Friedman test to determine exactly which of the three bond rating agencies first upgraded 
their ratings.
The data originally came from 112 electric utilities listed in the MCM Ratings 
Perspectives (1989\ There were 81 three-way ties. The rating changes follow ties. 
The agency that first departed the three way tie, is given the first rank, the agency that 
moved next is given the second rank and the agency that moved last is given the third 
rank. If there is more than one three way tie for a particular issuer, the most recent is 
used.
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A limitation o f the timeliness test o f Hypothesis Seven concerned external 
validity. Since the entire sample consisted o f electric utilities, the test results might 
have applied only to electric utilities.
The next step is to compare the chi-square test statistic = 60.9 with the tabulated 
value of chi-square with 2 degrees of freedom = 5.991. Clearly Ho7 is rejected at the a  
= 05 level of significance.
Because of Ho7’s rejection, one needed to determine which of the bond rating 
agencies differed from the others in terms of rating change timeliness. Choosing an q= 
.10, with k=3, Z = 2.05, yielded rank totals of:
________ Moody’s__________  S&P MCM
401.71 413.78 312.72
1401.71 -413.78| = 12.07 <26.1
1413.78 - 312.72| = 101.06 > 26.1 * [S&P & MCM]
1401.71 - 312.72| = 88.99 > 26.1 * [Moody’s & MCM]
Thus, MCM upgraded its ratings earlier than either Moody's or S&P; Moody's 
and S&P did not differ in terms of rating upgrades.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose ofthis study is to examine the effect of solicitation and independence 
on corporate bond ratings. Agencies which are totally or partially solicited receive a fee 
from issuers and therefore have the potential to assign biased ratings.
The independent agency, which accepts no fee from the issuer has no incentive 
to inflate ratings. The independent agency MCM is utilized to determine if its ratings 
differ from Moody’s or S&P and to determine if its upgrades are timely.
The Difference in Ratings Conclusion
The first research question indicates that an agency which performs only solicited 
ratings may provide significantly higher ratings. To be sure, the higher Duff and Phelps 
and Fitch IBCA ratings may in part, be attributed to sample selection bias. In addition, 
it is possible that the higher ratings are the more accurate or truer ratings. However, the 
fact that the ratings for Duff and Phelps are higher keeps open the hypothesis that 
solicited agency gives higher ratings because of the compensation arrangement. The 
ratings of both Duff and Phelps and Fitch IBCA have traditionally been sought when 
there is an expectation of obtaining a higher rating than that assigned by Moody’s or 
S&P. In recent years, issuers have often sought the ratings ofDuffand Phelps and Fitch
80
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IBCA without regard to whether there is an expectation of improving the ratings o f 
Moody’s and/or S&P.
The first research question is also important because the ratings provided by 
Moody’s and S&P are not significantly different even though there has been an ongoing 
Justice Department investigation of Moody’s. The investigation is focusing on the 
allegation that Moody’s may have pressured issuers to use its ratings in an attempt to 
expand its market share(Harington 1997). Hence, the results do not indicate that the 
investigation has been a factor in causing Moody’s ratings to differ from Standard and 
Poor’s. The timeliness hypotheses would be more appropriate in terms of determining 
whether Fitch IBCA is punishing issuers for not subscribing to its rating service.
The Timeliness Conclusions 
The second hypothesis, pertaining to timeliness of upgrades, is not rejected. This 
implies that the totally solicited firm (Duff and Phelps) is reluctant to take a conspicuous 
role in upgrades. A similar conclusion can be reached for Fitch IBCA.
The results of the third research question indicates that the fully or predominantly 
solicited agency have incentives which make it reluctant to provide the true rating. The 
results imply that Duff and Phelps and Fitch IBCA are hesitant to upset their clients. The 
close relations with management endemic to solicitation is likely causing these two 
agencies not to take any sort of assertiveness in terms of downgrading the issuers.
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The Magnitude Conclusions 
The results ofthe fourth research question which are another indicator of the effect 
of solicitation, imply that Moody’s is willing to be a leader in upgrading. Duff and Phelps 
would have less incentive in providing an upgrade or downgrade with higher magnitude. 
This result might be explained by the fact that only Duffand Phelps will honor an issuer’s 
request to be not rated. In addition, Duff and Phelps would have incentive to shift its 
ratings by only one level.
The results of the fifth hypothesis imply that the fully or highly solicited agencies 
are more concerned about their relationship with issuers. This conclusion is relevant 
because Moody’s and S&P have a larger downgrade magnitude than both Duff and 
Phelps, and Fitch IBCA. Furthermore, the internal validity increases because there is 
no difference in downgrade magnitude between Moody’s and S&P, and between Fitch 
IBCA and Duff and Phelps.
The Independence Conclusions 
The results show that MCM gives significantly lower ratings than Moody's and 
S&P. The results also show that MCM changed its ratings first more often than either 
S&P or Moody’s. From the findings of the sixth and seventh research questions, one 
can conclude that there is evidence that independence affects bond ratings and 
timeliness.
One can conclude that the independent agency can more easily assert that a 
particular issuer is having a deleterious effect on bondholders. The customers of the
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independent agency are provided with advanced word on bond upgrades. The 
conclusions for Hypotheses One thru Seven are depicted in Table 13.
Table 13: Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results






The ratings of the 
the four full-scale 
bond rating agencies 
did not differ.
Reject.
DCR and Fitch had 
higher ratings than 








may be the 
truer ratings 




Hvoothesis Two All four full-scale 
bond rating agencies 
upgraded their 
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time.
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bond rating agencies 
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time.
Reject
Moody’s and S&P 
both downgraded 
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Table 13: (continued)
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T. imitations
The use of electric utilities to test timeliness in Hypothesis Seven is a limitation 
with respect to external validity. It is difficult to determine whether the results of this test 
can be applied to other industries.
R ecnmmendations
Future research examine whether the market reacts more to MCM's, Moody’s, 
or S&P’s changes, extending the analysis of Weinstein (1977) and Wakeman (1981). 
Those two studies do not find that bond rating changes convey timely information.
Wakeman asserts that the rating agencies provide a valuable liquidity-enhancing 
service and that bond ratings do not appear to influence investors' pricing of bonds, at 
least after the initial issue. A limitation of Wakeman's study is that it is based solely on 
S&P and Moody's. Using an event study methodology, one can determine whether 
MCM's bond ratings influence investor's bond pricing. The event study methodology can 
also incorporate bond yields. As a confounding issue, MCM did not always change 
ratings before the others.
With MCM fully independent of the issuers, S&P and Moody's should not 
decrease ratings as quickly. When S&P and Moody’s downgrade a bond more quickly, 
that downgrade should contain more information.
Future studies of this issue should separate upgrades and downgrades. Hite and 
Warga (1997) asserted that downgraded firms revealed a significant announcement effect 
in both the announcement month and preannouncement period. The magnitude of
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downgrading effects, according to Hite and Warga (1997), increase dramatically as the 
sample changes from investment-grade to non-investment grade firms.
MCM specialized in high yield bonds. In order to determine whether MCM's 
ratings for these bonds meant more to the market than investment grade bonds, the study 
should analyze investment and speculative grades separately.
Intra-industry effects ofbond rating adjustments studied by Akhigbe, Madura and 
Whyte (1997) could be applied to the MCM case. It would be interesting to determine 
if  intra-industry rivals experience significantly negative valuation effects at the time of 
the MCM bond rating downgrade announcements. The MCM context, recognizing the 
only independent agency, may resolve the long-standing debate as to whether rating 
changes bring any new information to the market or just summarize existing information. 
The results of the present study provide impetus towards research on the independent 
agency Egan-Jones. Due to the results o f this study, Moody’s and S&P should face more 
competition from Egan-Jones and any new independent agencies. Egan-Jones should be 
able to become more financially viable by charging more for its ratings and publications. 
Investors should lose confidence in the timeliness of S&P and Moody’s ratings. More 
appeals of the ratings provided by Moody’s and S&P is likely to occur.
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